FROM THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
July 8, 2003
The Proposal Will Strengthen and Secure Americans’
Pension Security by:
• Improving the accuracy of the
pension liability discount rate
• Increasing the transparency of
pension plan information
• Strengthening safeguards against
pension underfunding
1. Improving the Accuracy of the Pension Liability
Discount Rate:
Accuracy is essential because too high a rate
leads to underfunding, putting retirees and taxpayers at risk. Too
low a rate causes businesses to contribute more than is needed to meet
future obligations, overburdening businesses at this early stage of the
recovery.
Use of Appropriate Yield Curve Discount Rate
The
Administration recommends that pension liabilities ultimately be
discounted with rates drawn from a corporate bond yield curve that takes
into account the term structure of a pension plan’s liabilities. For the
first two years, pension liabilities would be discounted using the blend
of corporate bond rates proposed in HR 1776 (Congressmen Portman and
Cardin). A phase-in to the appropriate yield curve discount rate
would begin in the third year and would be fully applicable by the fifth
year. Using the yield curve is essential to match the timing of future
benefit payments with the resources necessary to make the payments.
Phase In Use of Yield Curve for Lump
Sums
Currently, lump sums are valued using a lower rate than
that used for pension funding, draining pension plans’ assets whenever
lump sums are paid. In order to protect the retirement security of both
those who have not yet retired, and those who have chosen to take benefits
as an annuity, the Administration proposes that ultimately, lump sums be
discounted by the same rate used for other pension liabilities. In
order to avoid disrupting the plans of workers who will receive benefits
in the immediate future, lump sums would be computed using the 30-year
Treasury rate as under current law in years one and two. In the
third year a phase-in to the appropriate yield curve discount rate would
begin. By the fifth year lump sums will be dscounted by the same
rate used for other pension liabilities.
The Administration’s proposal is:
• Easy and
simple. It can be done using a simple
spreadsheet.
• Provides the right level of contributions.
Contributions will be based on an accurate determination of plan
liability.
• Recognizes current conditions. The interest
rate for the first two years will provide funding relief to plan
sponsors.
• Pro-growth. Pension funds are a significant
source of private investment that create growth and jobs.
• A
well-established best practice in financial accounting.
2. Increasing the Transparency of Pension Plan
Information:
Disclose Plan Assets and Liabilities on a Termination
Basis
The Administration proposes that all companies disclose
the value of pension plan assets and liabilities on a termination basis in
their annual reporting. Too often workers are unaware of the extent
of their plans’ underfunding until their plans terminate, frustrating
workers’ expectations of receiving promised benefits.
Disclose Funding Status of Severely Underfunded
Plans
The Administration proposes that certain financial data
already collected by the PBGC from companies sponsoring pension plans with
more than $50 million of underfunding should be made public.
Publicly available information would include the assets, liabilities and
funding ratios of the underfunded plan, but not confidential employer
financial information. This data is more timely and accurate that what is
publicly available under current law.
Disclose Liabilities Based on the Duration-matched Yield Curve
of Corporate Bonds
The Administration proposes that companies
annually disclose their liabilities as measured by the proposed yield
curve before duration-matching is fully phased in for funding
purposes. By providing this information before the new discount rate
is effective, workers and the financial markets will have more accurate
expectations of a plan’s funding obligations and status.
3. Strengthening Pension Funding to Protect Workers and Retirees:
Firms with Below Investment Grade Credit
Rating
When firms with junk bond credit ratings increase
pension benefit promises, these costs stand a good chance of being passed
on to the pension insurance system, frustrating the benefit expectations
of workers and retires and penalizing employers who have adequately funded
their plans. Under the Administration's proposal, if a plan's funding
ratio falls below 50 percent of termination liability, benefit
improvements would be prohibited, the plan would be frozen (no accruals
resulting from additional service, age or salary growth), and lump sum
payments would be prohibited unless the employer contributes cash or
provides security to fully fund these added benefits. In an analysis of
over half of PBGC claims, 90 percent of companies whose pension plans have
been trusteed by the PBGC had junk bond credit ratings for the entire ten
year period before termination.
4. The Administration Supports Comprehensive Funding Reforms
Congress should immediately implement the discount rate, benefit protection and transparency reform proposals. The Administration also is exploring additional funding reforms to protect workers’ retirement security by improving the funding status of all defined benefit plans. Issues under consideration include the proper establishment of funding targets; appropriate assumptions for mortality and retirement age and incentives for more consistent annual funding requirements.